We estimate a reduced form model of the redwood timber industry that is consistent with Hotelling's exhaustible resource theory. The consequences for this theory of various assumptions about the elasticity of expectations are derived. The estimated equations are used to test the hypotheses about expectations. We also use these equations to find the amount that owners of redwood not taken for the Redwood National Park benefitted from the park's establishment.
I. Introduction
The United States used its power of eminent domain to take a considerable fraction of all remaining old growth redwood for inclusion in the Redwood National Park. At the second of the two takings that were to be the Park, there were claims by the forest industry that the taking would ruin the economy of the redwood region l . The industry mounted a massive campaign to discourage the expansion of the Park with such publicity stunts as driving logging trucks through the streets of San Francisco (Champion) . Although it is hard to see how the Park could be in the interest of wood products workers, it is also bard to see how the Park could fail to be in the interest of the owners of the forest resource. They would receive just compensation, including payment for their timber and severance damages for the loss of economic usefulness of their mills, roads, etc. In addition, they (at least as a group) would be left with a unique resource in shorter supply.
The addition to the value of the remaining forest property caused by a taking is called "enhancementII Insofar as the enhancement affects the same operating unit as the taking affects and occurs at the time of the taking, the compensation for the taking can be offset by the enhancement. It is fair to assume that the industry captured the lion's share of this enhancement effect since, (1) a company (pacific Lumber) uninvolved in the taking holds a large portion of the remaining redwood; (2) much of the rest of the redwood is m units different from the units partially taken; and (3) the enhancement probably occurred before the actual day of the taking.
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the size of this enhancement Doing so requires a model of price formation. Since old-growth redwood is widely regarded as an exhaustible resource--its beauty comes from a growing process that takes many centuries--such a model should be consistent with Hotelling's resource model. The restrictions that the theory places on estimation are examined from a new perspective, that of short-and long-run changes in demand side variables. From this perspective, the theory is actually much less restrictive than one would otherwise have thought.
The paper begins with this introduction. Sectlon IT describes a class of estimable models that includes the Rotelling resource model and describes the restrictions that Rotelling's model implies. Section III contains the estimation of this model for the redwood stumpage market. Section IV contains tests for constancy of coefficients, for consistency with the theory, and for distinguishing long-and short-run effects. Section V contains an estimate of the dollar value of the enhancement in each of the Park takes.
Section VI is the conclusions. Appendix I contains a list of the variables and their sources, while Appendix n contains the estimation of an annualized price series.
II. The Model
The market for redwood stumpage depends upon the demand for redwood products and the producers' supply decisions. The demand side of the model leads to the simple estimation of a demand curve. The supply side is not so easy. Berek (1979) shows how these choices might be made with rational expectations by a present value maximizer. The choice facing the redwood producers is which year to sell their material. To make that choice, the producers need to make price forecasts for future years. These forecasts are themselves dependent upon the demand for the product in future years and the producers' view of their own behavior. With these forecasts, the producers could be profit maximizers, mean variance utility maximizers, or any of a number of other possible behavioral types.
Regardless of what the correct behavioral model is, the agents must base their decisions on the observable, relevant infonnation. This infonnation includes those variables that act as demand shifters, which we shall denote as z. To keep the discussion manageable, z will be discussed as if it were a scalar, but the actual estimation will involve three variables of this type. The variables, z, might include forecasts of z or lags of z, a point we shall return to later. The information also includes the inventory of the resource, x. In the case of oldgrowth redwood, the values of this variable were known by all with reasonable precision.
Finally, the agents need a measure of the return available on other assets, which we will take to be an interest rate, r. Thus, describing their behavior (observable quantity, q, and price) as functions of this infonnation gives reduced fonn equations that do not place great demands on behavioral assumptions about the agents. It is also common. 2 The three equations of this model, assuming a logarithmic functional form, are:
In(po) = bI + b2 1n(Z) + b3 In(r) + b4 In(x) Demand equation (1) Quantity equation (2) Price equation.
One possible model for the agent's behavior is the Rotelling model. This model, which we shall present in two forms, places testable restrictions on the coefficients of the reduced fonn equations. The next subsection describes the restrictions that Rotelling's model places on equations of this form and interprets the variables, z, as being used for short-or long-term forecasts.
Consistency with the Rotelling Model
The wel1~knownHotelling model analyzes a natural resource model as equilibrium in a product and capital market The resource, being a capital asset, must earn the same rate of return as any other capital asset. The flow of the resource is an ordinary product whose supply must equal its demand. 
Letting the demand curve have the constant elasticity fonn, Q =f(z)p-a, where f is continuously differentiable, this integral becomes
which can be solved for the estimating equation for price,
4
In log fonn the demand curve is In(Qo) =In(f(z)) -a. In(po) , so the estimating equation for quantity is
The demand curve and equations (3) and (4) 
The frrst integral is the sum of demand in the short run and the second integral is the sum of demand in the long run. To fmd the effect of changing the demand shifters in the long and short run, totally differentiate the exhaustion equation with respect frrst to Zs and PO and then with respect to ZL and po.
s T 0= J(Qz dz s + Qp dp) dt + f (Qp dp) dt o S and s T 0= f (Qp dp) dt + f (Qz dZL +Qp dp) dt.
5 These two equations are enough to derive limiting results--for the case when the short run is very short--thatare not dependent on functional fonn. On taking the limit of equation (9) as s~0, one finds that dp/dz s =0, or price does not respond to transient changes in the demand for the resource. Taking the limit as s~0 in equation (10) shows that price does respond to pennanent changes in demand. The situation for quantity is somewhat less clear. Since transient changes in demand do not affect price, the partial derivative of demand with respect to Zs is also the total derivative. The effect of a long-run change on quantity could, however, be zero. All that is needed is for the second integral in equation (10) to be zero which, in fact, happens for constant elasticity demand--a case to which we now return.
Substituting the functional form of the demand curve into equation (8) gives:
s T x =Jf(zs) PO-a e-rat dt + Jf(ZL) PO-a e-rat dt.
Assuming Zs and ZL are constants, carrying out the integration, taking logarithms, and solving for In(PO) gives
0;
On substituting (12) into the demand equation, one gets the equation for QO:
Equations (11) and (12) As s~0, one gets dpo/dz s = 0., which is expected, and
Thus, in the limiting case, short-run changes in demand conditions have no effect on price and change quantity in exactly the way one would predict from looking at the demand curve, holding price constant. Long-run changes in demand condition, on the other hand, do change price but have no effect on quantity at alL The estimable equations (1)- (3) can be tested for the restrictions implied by the various forms of the Rotelling model. Because it is the current inventory and not its expectation at some future time that appears in the equations, all fonns of the model contain restrictions across equations on the inventory variable. As the model is written, the same is true of the interest rate variable, though one could certainly conceive of the case in which there was a different interest rate used for the two subperiods. In tenns of equations (1)- (3), the inventory and interest rate restrictions are 7
In the simple Rotelling model, which is also the case if s~0, the parameter restrictions are that z is missing from the quantity equation and its elasticity in the price equation is a multiple of its demand elasticity:
In the short-run-long-run fonn of the model, the restriction that a change in Z changes only Zs and not ZL is
Finally, in the short-run-Iong-run model, the restriction that a change in Z changes only ZL and not Zs is (22) In summary, Rotelling's theory (and the choice of functional fonn) imply the restrictions in equation (19) . When an observed change in a demand shifter has the same effect in the short and long run, equation (20) is true. When the change is short run only, (21) is true. When the change is long run only, (22) is true. One could also construct cases intennediate between (21) and (22) but, the statistical tests below will show that this effort is not really necessary.
In our discussion so far we have treated s and T as fixed numbers and, more importantly, the difference T -s as flXed. 1fT were very far into the future (or in the limit, 00), this would pose no problem for estimation. A more general view of T and s would be that T is a calendar date, D is the current date, and S is the time interval for the short run, so its calendar date, s, is S + D. Time series estimation occurs at a sequence of calendar dates, so the time between the end of the short run and the tenninal time, T, is T -S -D.
The weighting of the short-and long-run effects in equations (12) and (13) depends on the terms (1 -e-ars ) and (e-ars -e-arT ) which generalize to (1 -e-arS ) and (e-cxrS -e-a.r(T-D») when one considers many possible starting dates for the estimation.
Since the weighting of the long-and short-tenn effects varies over the sample period, one might expect the coefficients in the estimated equations to systematically change in their value over the sample. The other possibility is that T is so far in the future that the reweighting of the long-and short-term effects makes no difference whatsoever. A test for the constancy of coefficients, reported below, resolves this question.
In summary, Hotelling's model and the functional form always imply the testable restrictions on the coefficients on inventory and interest rates. Assumptions about elasticity of expectations--whether observable changes affect the short or long run or both--are testable. So is the assumption that the tenninal time is far enough in the future so that it does not affect the estimation. Before performing these tests of constancy and of the restrictions, we fITSt tum to the estimation of equations (1)-(3).
III. Estimation
The data to estimate a reduced fonn system for old growth redwood consist of information on the housing related variables, interest rates, inventories of redwood and a competing species, and pric~information. In this section we present the estimation of the three equations.
The price infonnation was records of 162 sales from 1953 to 1977. The time span was chosen to begin after the Korean conflict and the post-World War II adjustment and to end with the second taking of the Park. With that second taking, the quantities of old growth redwood left in private hands was too small to constitute much of a market for these statistical purposes. Worse, the bidding on the few sales that did occur might well have been influenced by a desire to increase the value of the Park take. Appendix II details our use of this price infonnation.
A. Demand
The demand for redwood stumpage is a derived demand and as such depends upon its price and the demand for the items for which it is used. Based on this equation, the own price elasticity of demand is .36. 5 The asymptotic t-ratio indicates that it is unlikely the true elasticity is of the wrong sign. The sum of the demand elasticities for housing starts and additions and maintenance are 1.06, which is nearly one. This is sensible since one expects a doubling of the demand for the things where redwood is used to double the demand for redwood. The t-ratios on these variables show that they are significantly different from zero at the .95% leveL The growing stock of the competing~pecies has a coefficient near zero, indicative of an inability to measure this effect or of an actual lack of substitution possibilities. Insofar as redwood. is used for decking, hot tubs, and decoration, the substitutio'n effects may indeed be small, but the construction uses should be easily substitutable with treated lumber. Thus, we favor the conclusion that the effects are simply difficult to measure.
The R2 of this equation is 0.50 and the Durbin-Watson statistic is 2.12, indicating
an acceptable fit and that we cannot reject the hypothesis of no autocorrelation or obvious misspecification.
B. Reduced Fonn Price Equation
The reduced fonn price equation is the regression of the log of price on all the exogenous variables in the system. Housing starts, additions and maintenance expenses, and the stock of competing sPeCies, fIr, are assumed to influence demand. Supply depends directly upon stock and interest rate as well as on all of the demand side variables. Thus, the reduced fonn price equation is the regression of the log of price on the log of these five variables.
10 log(price) = s.e. The outstanding result in this equation is the very strong effect of stock on current price. The elasticity is 1.6, so a 1 percent decrease in the remaining stock increases the price by 1.6 Percent The standard error on this coefficient is .53, so the hypothesis that the coefficient has the wrong sign can be rejected at the 95 percent significance level while the hypothesis that the true elasiticity is unity cannot be rejected Of the other coefficients, only that on housing starts is statistically significantly different from zero. Any portfolio theory that has redwood and bonds as assets would predict that increased interest rates, ceteris paribus~would lead to a decrease in the demand for redwood as an asset and thus a decrease in its price. The real interest rate variable is of the wrong sign but has a negligible coefficient and is not statistically significantly different from zero. The problem may simply be that the long-term real interest rate is inde~constant. 6
C. Reduced Fonn Quantity
Finally, the reduced form equation for quantity:
:. 
Constancy of CoefficientS
When the tenninal time is near, the short and long run become the same, which is to say, everything is the long run. Thus, if the terminal time were near enough to influence choices very much, one would expect that the responsiveness of price to demand shift variables would increase over time.
One simple test for this sort of behavior is to allow the coeffcient on honsing starts to take on one value in the fust years and a second value in the later years. Testing equation by equation for a difference in the values of this coefficient yields the conclusion that it changed in no equation. The values of the coefficient are less than 2 percent different in any equation, and the greatest t-statistic for a difference is .8. Thus, it is highly unlikely that the coefficient on housing starts changed very much over the time period.
The second test perfonned was that there were two distinct time periods for all the coefficients. The F.95(6,13) statistics were 1.56 for the price equation and 2.38 for the quantity equation. The critical value is 2.63, so we conclude that the coefficients did not change radically over time and the effect of the approach of the tenninal time was not important.
Finally, a Brown-Durbin-Evans (1975) 
IV. Testing the Hotelling Theory
In the classic Rotelling case the long and short run are identical, or s = 0 and T = 00.
Letting the elasticity of demand be a and the demand elasticity of housing starts be p, the theory implies that the housing start elasticity of price is~/a and the housing start elasticity of quantity is zero. The last test is for the changes in housing starts reflecting only a short tenn effect Here the test statistic is 4.43 with 2 degrees of freedom. Again, the X 2 (2) statistic does not reject the hypothesis that long-term expectations of housing starts are unaffected by shorttenn changes. Equivalently, current values of housing starts do not affect the agent's long term expectations about housing starts.
V. The Effects of the Taking
The Redwood National Park was created by taking 3.1 million thousand board feet (MBF) from the private sector. The frrst taking in January of 1968 accounted for 1.7 million MBF, while the March 27, 1978 taking was 1.4 million MBF. After these two takings, private inventories of old-growth redwood were 7.2 million MBF. Thus, the two takes together removed 30 percent of the available old-growth redwood supply.
The calculation for the effects of the second Park take, evaluated at the time of the taking, are straightforward The take was 16.2 percent of the available inventory. The price elasticity of inventory estimated above was 1.6, so the effect of the taking was to increase price by 26.0 percent. The market price predicted from the sales data for 1.978 was $310, so the Park take was responsible for raising prices by $81 per MBF.
Multiplying this quantity through by the 7.2 million MBF remaining in private hands gives an increase of $583 million accruing to the remaining redwood holders. It is in addition to the amounts paid by the government to the companies whose timber they took:, which was $689,527,000.7 The timber taken for the Park was not, of course, average timber and thatã s well as a host of ancillary issues, is why the timber taken appears to be worth so much more per MBF than the remaining timber.
Similar calculations can be made for the 1968 take. The price at that time was $57.7 per MBF; the inventory was 19.1 million MBF. Thus, the price change was $5.4
per MBF for a frnal value of$103 million accruing to holders of private timber beyond the value paid by the government for the Park, which was $155 million.
The standard error for the elasticity estimate is one-half so, even at the lower edge of a 95 percent confidence interval, the increased values from the Park takes are in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Similarly, if one alters the specification of the equation by using a price series predicted by a linear rather than log-log regression, one gets an elasticity of .8, still leading to increased values in the hundreds of millions of dollars.
The bottom line of this exercise is that the timber companies were very well served by the Park takings, and their protestations to the contrary are less than comprehensible.
Put differently, the companies could well have donated the Parks if they could have found a way to share the gains.
VI. Conclusions
The removal of the stock of an exhaustible will drive up the price of the remaining stock, and when the stock is small to begin with, the effect can be quite dramatic.
Redwood National Park was purchased by the government for the precise purpose of saving some of the last remaining redwoods, so the effect of the taking on price should be, and was, large. The companies holding remaining timber benefitted by $583 million, so the consumers of redwood must have lost at least this amount. Excluding interest, the cost to non redwood owning Americans of the second park take was about $1.2 billion--the higher cost of wood plus the price of the taking--which was a far cry from the approximately $300 million Congress set aside to buy the Park. One wonders whether the Park would still have been taken if the full cost to the public had been known. 
Annualized Price Series
The price of stumpage should be a function of the location, quality, and time of the stumpage sale. A regression of price on these characteristics would recover the relationship which could then be used to construct a price series for constant quality sales. The constant A regression, in log-log fonn, of price on these other variables gave a reasonable fit--an R2 of91 percent--and most of the yearly dummies significantly different from zero at the 95 percent level.
Based on these regression results, we estimate that a 1 percent increase in the sale volume increases price by .04 Percent, and this is statistically significantly different from zero. If one believes that large sales can costly be broken down into small sales and small sales costlessly aggregated into large sales, this coefficient should be zero, which it is not.
Although this may at fIrSt seem like a small elasticity, the largest sale is 2,400 times the smallest one, resulting in a near doubling of the price because of the volume effect. A 1 percent change in percent uppers changes price by .28 percent. Since percent uppers is on the order of 50, this works out that a change in percent uppers from 50 peteent to 60 percent results in a 5.6 percent change in price. The standard error on this coefficient is large, however. The seller or buyer type and county of sale dummies hold only the surprise that, when the state is the buyer, price is appreciably higher. Since the state may be buying trees different from those of other buyers--larger and more scenic--this is explainable.
The prediction perrorrnance of this equation was measured with a jacknife (Efron 1982) . The root mean square error of prediction was $33, which is trivial by comparison with the prices in the later part of the period but very large compared to the early prices.
The root mean square percent error was 46 percent t which gives a much better feel for the accuracy of prediction for an individual sale. The average of many such sales would have a prediction error very similar to that part of the prediction error caused by uncertainty in the locus of the regression line, which would give numbers about half of the above. Thus, for the purposes of deriving a yearly price, the errors should be in the 20-30 percent range. Table 1 gives the coefficients, their standard errors, and t-statistics. The predicted series for price was prepared by antilogging the predictions of the log of price plus one half the standard error of the regression, which accounts for the difference between the expectation of a log normal~d a nonnal distribution. Table 2 gives the predicted prices. 
TABLE 2 Yearly Price
lSee, for instance,Westem Council of Lumber Production, "Additions to the park would cause severe econoimic impacts," including the "displacement of hundreds more workers from the industry," erosion of the tax base and lIdeterioration of government services." 2Pisher, Cootner and Bailey, model production from scrap as depending on the stock of scrap and the price. Adams and Haynes, model stumpage supply as depending on stock and price. Pindyck models the supply of fringe finns as depending on price and cumulative production, which is just total quantity less remaining reserves. All of these models are silent as to the behavioral model for the agent, and all these models lead to reduced forms similar to the fonn chosen in this paper. 3Hicks (1939), P 204 et seq., discusses the elasticity of expectations in terms of whether a one percent priGe change today would be expected to also cause a price change tomorrow. He distinguishes the pivotal cases of 0 and 1. 4The model could be expanded by making demand grow at an exponential rate;y, less than ra without changing the qualitative results. Such an expansion would simply have the effect of replacing the ra. tenus with y-ra..
5 In McKillop's (1969) earlier redwood work, using different demand shift variables and a monthly rather than a yearly time frame, the estimated elasticity was .42.
6 Fama (1970) is of this opinion, but the matter is far from settled.
7The sum is the total of all the Judgments and Orders for civil cases C78-0879TEH, C78-0868 TEH, and C78-0874 TEH, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, August 10, 1987 
